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Wealth, Composition, Housing, Income, and Consumption 
 
Abstract 
 
The present research, which covers the latest residential boom and bust cycle, highlights 
that there are no uniform or constant time invariant wealth, housing, and income relations. 
Even more important, wealth composition is shown to be a significant determinant of 
consumption. The marginal effects of housing wealth, financial wealth, and income differ 
substantially with wealth composition. Households with the highest percentage of net 
worth in financial assets have much lower income effects, have substantially higher 
marginal effects associated with stock holdings, and have housing equity effects that differ 
noticeably from other households. Income effects for groups with the smallest amounts of 
relative financial wealth are dramatically higher than for households with greater financial 
wealth. Wealth and its composition affect consumption. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The relations between housing wealth, financial wealth, income, and consumption are 
of substantial interest to public policy analysts, economic forecasters, and business 
managers since consumer spending is a dominant component of economic activity. While it 
would be helpful if the relations between these factors were known with certainty, the 
existing literature provides mixed and ambiguous results,
1
 which may be related to 
limitations in data utilized, temporal variability, the composition of individual household 
wealth, and the permanence of unexpected income or wealth gains.  
Acknowledgement of inequalities in financial wealth is also necessary since financial 
wealth impacts the composition of household net worth. Inequality in financial wealth 
affects the marginal importance of housing wealth and income on consumption when 
households are segmented by aggregate wealth and percentage of total wealth in financial 
assets. While residential wealth is a major component of many households’ net worth, it is 
less accessible than financial wealth and often has ongoing, recurrent costs, even when 
unencumbered by debt, due to routine maintenance and property taxes. Studies imply that 
owner occupied residential real estate acts as a forced savings plan since the asset generally 
increases in value in the long term while debt secured by the property is amortized. 
Concurrently, few studies on this topic formally acknowledge the skewed household wealth 
patterns found in the United States. None investigate the relative composition of wealth.       
The data examined cover the pre-real estate boom period (1994-1999), the real estate 
boom market (2001-2005), and the post-boom (heading into bust) real estate market 
                                                             
1 Existing research has pegged marginal consumption from a housing wealth effect at anywhere from 2% to 
15% or more based on methodology and data studied (Benjamin, Chinloy and Jud (2004), Case, Quigley, 
and Shiller (2005), Campbell and Cocco (2007), Kishor (2007), and Carroll, Otsuka and Slacalek  (2011) and 
others). 
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(2007).
2
 By inclusion of the real estate boom and decline periods, our analysis depicts a 
broader picture of housing wealth effects on consumption than has generally been permitted. 
We also segment the results by household wealth and link the relative magnitude of 
financial versus housing wealth into the assessment. Assessment is provided using pooled 
data as well as with specific disaggregation by sample year.   
The focus on non-durable consumption differs from Bostic, Gabriel, and Painter (2009), 
who examine total consumption and durable goods consumption.
3
 Durable goods purchases 
are discrete in timing, have non-negligible transaction costs, and consequently  have 
different consumption patterns than non-durables. Interestingly, Bostic etal (2009) find no 
significant relations between house value or equity and durable goods consumption, 
although they find a relation between house value and total consumption. The implication is 
that non-durable consumption may be more dependent on house value or home equity. 
While this may seem counterintuitve, the largest durable goods (automobiles, for example) 
acquired by housholds are often financed with purchase loans. Large scale financing 
operations related to their sale are the norm. Our concentration on non-durable consumption 
thus helps fill one of the voids in the literature. Research by Benjamin and Chinloy (2004) 
and Benjamin, Chinloy and Jud (2008) positing that the relations between consumption and 
housing wealth need not be positive is also extended.  
Empirical results, including those from the relative composition of wealth, follow. First, 
we show that the wealth effects of stock and housing differ over time and that the use of a 
measure derived from pooled data can be misleading. The housing wealth effect is normally 
                                                             
2 Bostic Gabriel, and Painter (2009), Benjamin, Chinloy, and Jud (2004), and Benjamin, Chinloy, and Jud 
(2008) and others confine their analysis to the pre-real estate boom period. 
3 A major issue that has impacted the assessment of these effects is limited data on consumption. Like in 
prior studies this limitation is acknowledged. 
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stronger than the stock holdings/financial assets effect. However, subsequent to the housing 
market peak, the relative strength of the competing effects switch. Next, we investigate 
whether wealth level by itself influences consumption elasticity. We find that the more 
wealthy families enjoy higher elasticities of consumption on all components of wealth, but 
not income. This indicates that even the more wealthy households (based on total assets 
including residential housing and finanical assets) are still partially dependent on housing 
equity for consumption.  
To further address the wealth impact on consumption, we extend studies by Grossman 
and Laroque (1990), Stokey (2009), and Flavin and Yamashita (2008, 2011),  which  
highlight the role of housing-to-wealth ratios in determining optimal portfolio choice and 
life-cycle consumption allocation. That is, the housing value to wealth ratio is important 
and not just wealth level. While we use the housing value to net worth or wealth ratio from 
the literature, we also use a cleaner measure of housing equity as a percentage of wealth. 
The ratio of home equity to wealth is used to segment the aggregate sample into several 
subsamples. For households whose home equity matters more in their wealth position, the 
consumption elasticity corresponding to home equity is substantially higher. For 
households whose stock holdings or finanical assets matter more, the consumption elasticity 
of the stock holdings is significant and higher. The results show the importance of 
characterizing households using wealth composition. Consumption by households with the 
lowest percentage of net worth in housing (highest percentage in stock/financial assets) is 
not impacted by housing wealth. Consumption by households with the greatest 
concentration of net worth in financial assets/stock is affected by financial wealth, but not 
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home equity. In all cases, the magnitude of the differences in marginal effects is large with 
practical implications. 
The relations between housing wealth, financial wealth, income and consumption are 
complex. Wealth alone, wealth composition associated with the percentage of net worth in 
financial assets, and temporal effects associated with macro-economic conditions all impact 
consumption. Differentiation of impacts based on wealth composition provides the 
foundation for additional investigation of spending patterns using segmented consumer 
groups. For the wealthiest, financial asset performance is likely to have a greater impact 
than home equity changes. With regard to the average household, the importance of 
housing to consumption is manifested. 
 
2. Literature 
 
There is substantial interest in wealth effects and consumption. Research in several 
related disciplines has concentrated on these relations as consumption is central to 
economic activity, housing wealth is a major portion of total household wealth, and housing 
construction and related activities are central to economic growth. Consumption cycles are 
related to life cycles which are impacted by wealth and potentially transient asset flows. 
The general wealth effect and real estate or housing specific wealth effects are most 
germane to the present research. Existing empirical assessments, while generally showing 
wealth effects impacting consumption, suffer from substantive variation in coefficient 
magnitudes and changing measures of statistical significance. 
There are a number studies that investigate financial and housing wealth effects. Major 
studies include earlier work by Elliot (1980) and Bhatia (1987), and more recently, Belsky 
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and Prakken (2004), Lettau and Ludvigson (2004), Case, Quigley, and Shiller (2005) and 
Carrol, Otuska, and Slacalek (2011) which focus on non-housing wealth effects, while 
controlling for housing effects. Additional studies by Skinner (1989), Benjamin, Chinloy, 
and Jud (2004), Campbell and Coco (2007), Kishor (2007), Benjamin and Chinloy (2008), 
and Bostic, Gabriel, and Painter (2009) are more focused on the housing wealth effect.   
Using aggregate United States time series data, Elliot (1980) shows a large financial 
wealth effect, but finds no real estate related wealth effect. Bhatia (1987) counters Elliot’s 
use of construction costs as the measure of real estate wealth, and, by employing market 
value measures instead, finds a substantial housing wealth effect (coefficient estimate 
of .37), and no financial wealth effect. The housing wealth effect is likely masked in the 
earlier period due to data issues coming from aggregated data and the lack of a more liquid 
real estate market, including the ability to refinance mortgage loans easily and access 
housing wealth through equity lines of credit, during the period studied. Skinner (1989) 
extends Elliot (1980) and Bhatia (1986) by showing a positive housing wealth effect. The 
suggestion is that the housing wealth effect is meaningful and needs additional investigation. 
Belsky and Prakken (2004) find that the housing wealth effect is about .05 to .07 which is 
much lower than that of Bhatia. 
Lettau and Ludvigson (2004) argue that the expected permanence of a wealth effect is 
important. Hence, financial wealth with more volatility is likely to have a smaller wealth 
effect than housing wealth which is postulated to have more permanence. Their empirical 
assessment backs this claim, although one would no longer argue that housing wealth is 
inherently more permanent after the latest real estate cycle. Case, Quigley, and Shiller 
(2005) look at housing and financial wealth effects in the United States and internationally 
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and show a substantial housing wealth effect, but no or little financial wealth effect in the 
United States. Data are for the year 1999 and prior. Variability of the housing effect at the 
state level is also shown. The suggestion is that the housing effect is of more importance 
than other wealth effects. Carroll, Otsuka, and Slacalek (2011) compare financial and 
housing wealth effects and postulate that the empirical specifications of the housing and 
financial effects are similar at about .02 in the short run with additional longer term impacts. 
This estimate is at the lower range of existing studies.    
Benjamin, Chinloy, and Jud (2004) use aggregate data from the United States to 
investigate the relation between housing wealth and consumption. A .08 marginal housing 
wealth effect is shown along with a much smaller .02 financial wealth effect. Perhaps more 
interesting, Benjamin and Chinloy (2008) argue that consumption need not be positively 
correlated with net wealth. Wealth can either be accumulating or being used for 
consumption and the relation is dependent on other economic factors and the smoothing of 
consumption over time. This implies that marginal effects will change over time, without 
changing the model specification.  
Kishor (2007) finds marginal effects for housing of about .07 and .03 for financial 
wealth in a study using United States data. Bostic, Gabrial, and Painter (2009) model total 
consumption prior to the real estate boom and bust cycle using matched micro data and find 
that relations between housing wealth and consumption are large and much greater than 
financial effects. They find no relation between housing wealth and durable consumption, 
but do show a relation with total consumption. Finally, another point of emphasis is the 
variability of marginal effects shown in prior studies. The coefficients of interest in existing 
studies are not stable, but do evidence directionally expected outcomes.  
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In almost all existing cases, interest is primarily associated with generating macro level 
financial and housing wealth effects using aggregate data. Our interest is in generating 
marginal effects from household level data, estimating time-varying differences, addressing 
the skewed wealth distribution in the United States and acknowledging that a household’s 
level and relative composition of wealth will impact consumption. 
 
3. Model and Empirical Specification  
 
From the classical theory of consumption, a consumer bases his consumption decision 
on existing and expected resources. We conjecture that consumers/households view the 
components of their wealth portfolio differently, depending upon both the availability of 
each component, the ease of conversion to spendable cash, and the cash outlays associated 
with ownership of the asset. In comparing housing and stock/financial wealth, stock 
holdings are easier to liquidate and spend for consumption. Only a small fraction of the U.S. 
population holds stocks at meaningful levels, especially outside of retirement accounts that 
generally have high use costs associated with taxes. Historically, home equity is more 
equitable across households, and borrowing against home equity has been cheaper than 
other means of borrowing such as credit cards. The constraining side is the level of home 
equity available to a household as well as the tightness of credit markets. Existing mortgage 
indebtedness constrains the capability to tap home equity for consumption since a greater 
outstanding balance of mortgage debt reduces the net equity in housing. Current income is a 
cash equivalent, while the ability and desire for using other assets is determined by the level 
and composition of other wealth components. 
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3.1  The Model 
 
In the economy there is one composite, liquid risky market asset, which we call stocks. 
In addition, a household can choose the amount of housing units (in market value relative to 
consumption goods) for personal residence. We assume a household manages its balance 
sheet according to cash equivalent units and define  and  as values between 0 and 1, 
and being the cash equivalent coefficients for stock holdings and house equity, respectively. 
Following Benjamin and Chinloy (2008), the cash-equivalent wealth equality is: 
 
,                      1 
 
where S, H, D stand for stock holding, house value, and debt, respectively. The use of a 
mortgage provides a cash equivalent in two ways. First, the greater the use of debt in the 
property acquisition the smaller the homeowner’s cash outlay for acquisition. And second, 
with more debt, the ability to actually refinance and extract cash through the refinancing 
procedure will decline.
4
 Equation 1, by itself, is without any restriction of having to pay off 
debt. Thus, more debt is associated with more cash-equivalents for use. An additional 
equality in the above equation is illuminating: a higher cash-equivalent coefficient for 
housing assets, , leads to a higher level of wealth perceived by the household, due to the 
convertibility of house value (or equity) to cash. However, the cash equivalent of existing 
debt decreases due to the higher opportunity cost of the current debt balance. 
                                                             
4  Muellbauer (2007) makes a related argument that higher loan-to-value ratios increase consumption. 
Again, higher debt allows retention of cash for consumption. 
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In the equation that relates consumption to wealth by the marginal propensity to 
consume (MPC) or  , 
 
.                   2 
 
The overall coefficients ( ) before each component of wealth are the product of MPC 
and corresponding cash equivalent coefficients. Our goal of the model sketched below is to 
determine the optimal value of  to see how it is related to the ’s and other parameters. 
Stock and housing prices follow the Brownian process (subscripts ,  indicate the 
process for stocks, housing assets, and mortgage, respectively) 
 
                                                       3 
 The formula for the dynamics of this cash-equivalent wealth is 
 
 
.                                        4 
 
There is a limit for mortgage borrowing, however. Otherwise people will withdraw as much 
cash as they want. We model this limit as the house value at each point of time, that is, the 
mortgage debt cannot go above a certain percentage of the house value 
 
.                                   5 
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where  is the maximum loan-to-value ratio. 
We assume the household is maximizing its expected lifetime utility which includes 
housing services and a nondurable consumption good 
 
.                                                                               6 
 
While it is easy to propose a frictionless model, it has been correctly noted in the 
literature that housing assets do not adjust frictionlessly (Grossman and Laroque, 1990). 
Typically, a household pays transaction costs when buying and selling houses and when 
refinancing. Assuming the proportion of transaction costs to the value of a house is , the 
Bellman equation that characterizes a household’s optimization problem is (without loss of 
generality,  suppose the decision time is at time 0): 
 
  .                     7 
 
where  indicates the selling of an old house before purchasing a new one. This is an 
optimal stopping problem since the household has to decide when to sell a house (the value 
of ) along with other variables. 
 Between stopping times, however, the household’s decisions only involve adjusting 
the liquid financial assets, including mortgage debts, and non-durable consumption goods, 
while the value of its housing assets is exogenously changed by market conditions. During 
a short time interval  within which stopping does not occur, the Bellman equation is: 
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.                          8 
 
As shown by Flavin and Yamashita (2008), taking , the solution is similar to the 
familiar HJB equation 
 
                                        9 
where 
 
                                     10 
 
And subject to constraints in Equations 4 and 5. 
The solution of this optimization problem, given in its current format, is now standard. 
Solving for the optimal amounts of stocks and debts, we obtain 
 
.                                                                 11 
 
If a household is not borrowing constrained, the ratio between stocks and debt is 
.                                                                 12 
 
The equation for  in Equation 11 says that when a household is not faced with 
borrowing constraints and the liquidity from converting home equity ( ) increases, the 
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cashed-out home equity in relation to the overall cashable wealth decreases. The equation 
for  in Equation12 says the ratio of stock to debt level is higher corresponding to a higher 
liquidity of home equity. That is, holding house stock constant, a higher degree of liquidity 
of home equity would lead to a higher ratio of stocks to home equity. 
Further characterization of portfolio rules and consumption plan requires specification 
of the utility function. We stipulate the housing is complementary to non-durable 
consumption in a multiplicative way: 
 
                                                                                 13 
 
where  is some unspecified function of . We conjecture that the functional form of 
value function  and its first and second derivatives with respect to  are 
 
                  14 
 
and . When a household is not borrowing constrained, , 
which implies a threshold value  in that if , then the 
household is not constrained. The optimal consumption plan is 
, where 
 
                      
15 
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The sign of the change of  in response to an increase in  is ambiguous. Consider 
, as has been confirmed by the macro finance literature. The first square bracket term 
in Equation 15 captures the effect on consumption through amplifying housing asset returns 
and volatility by increasing  , the net effect of which is undetermined without inputs from 
calibration values. The last square bracket term captures the negative effect on consumption 
by reduced cash-equivalent of existing cash-out debt due to higher opportunity cost. The 
total effect is thus ambiguous. 
When  a household is borrowing constrained, . The optimal 
consumption plan is , where 
 
.    
16 
 
Once again, the change of  in response to  is ambiguous without further inputs of other 
parameter values. Thus, how consumption responds to different components of wealth in 
response to the liquidity of home equity is an empirical question. 
Given a consumer’s desire for consumption, besides income, he can draw down his 
available liquid financial assets, or if that is not available, choose to borrow. The ability to 
borrow depends on current credit market conditions. If the ability to borrow is constrained, 
this consumer has to rely on income source more heavily. 
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3.2  The Empirical Specification 
 
The difference in , i.e., convertibility of home equity in the equations above, may be 
determined by two aspects of a household’s wealth portfolio: first, the size of home equity 
itself; second, by how much else is available in liquid wealth that can support borrowing, as 
sizable liquid assets can help obtain favorable borrowing terms. To account for the 
influence of both, we proceed with home equity as a regressor in our regressions. We also 
segment the data along the dimension of ratio of home equity to wealth. The empirical 
questions are investigated in several ways. First, differences in cross-sectional regressions 
over various years when presumably the liquidity of home equity differs are assessed. The 
question of interest is the stability of the relations between stock/financial wealth, housing 
equity, income and non-durable consumption. Second, differences in consumption patterns 
for individuals who presumably differ in their access to and need for credit in the mortgage 
markets based on aggregate and decomposed wealth are analyzed. Aggregate wealth and 
the composition of wealth are posited to impact consumption patterns. 
Since it is well known that many wealth measures are right-skewed, an OLS estimation 
would be overwhelmingly influenced by the observations at the right tails of distributions. 
Hence, the median regression methodology is used instead, which is also noticeably 
different from predominant estimation methods employed in the literature.  
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4. Data and Results 
 
Cross-section samples from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID henceforth) 
database spanning the years from 1994 to 2007 are drawn in order to address these 
questions.
5
 The PSID database has been used in related studies by Engelhardt (1996), 
Skinner (1996) and Lehnart (2003). In particular, we concentrate on those households that 
own a home, have non-negligible holdings of stocks (≥ $500), non-durable consumption 
that is not too extreme (> $500 and <$350,000), and have positive mortgage balances 
outstanding. Home equity is the house value net of existing mortgage balances, and is 
therefore a potential source of funding when positive. The literature has not focused on this 
subset of households in prior studies. Mortgage balances reflect cash that has already been 
obtained or conserved, even though debt has to be repaid.  
The data is summarized in Table 1 which segments data based on observation year. The 
data are in constant 1982-84 dollars. The median age moves upward slightly. Family size 
and marital status are consistent across years. Median stock holdings remain below $15,000 
in constant dollars across all periods. Average stock holdings increase by less than 100% 
while the standard deviation in stock holdings increases dramatically over the period 
indicating that a small number of households have outsized gains in financial assets. Home 
equity increases (about doubling) over the period. Households show increases in real 
income for the period on average, but median income is only up slightly. The data implies a 
concentration of financial assets and income in the highest tier for the period. 
                                                             
5 PSID is a nationally representative sample of U.S. households starting from 1968 with over 18,000 
individuals living in 5000 families. It is of longitudinal nature in design, but cross-sectionally also 
representative. Since 1999, PSID has switched from annual surveys to biennial ones. Furthermore, prior to 
1999, wealth information is only solicited once every five years.  
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The first column of Table 2 presents the median regression results of the log of 
consumption for all observations in the sample. For the overall sample, the consumption 
elasticity of home equity is 0.02, doubling that of stock/financial holdings (with both being 
statistically significant at the 1% level). These results are in line with some existing 
research showing that the home equity or value impact is greater that the stock wealth effect. 
The results, however, are at the lower end of existing estimates. The elasticity of mortgage 
borrowing is higher than these two estimates (statistically significant at the 1% level) as 
might be expected from Benjamin and Chinloy (2008). Utilization of additional debt 
supported by house value is more important than prospective use as measured by actual 
equity. In short, additional debt is used systemically to support consumption. This is 
affirmative of the data in Table 1 where mortgage debt in real terms increases over the 
period. Coefficients of the additional control variables in the model are as expected. 
The subsequent columns of Table 2 examine the relative effects of these three 
components separately for each data year between 1994 and 2007. During the years 2001-
2005, when home credit is widely available and people can easily cash out available home 
equity, the consumption elasticity of mortgage balances approaches 0.10. The same is true 
for available home equity during 2001-2003: in 2003 it is 0.06, higher than that of any other 
year and implying that prospective equity cash outs supported consumption. Yet in 2005, 
arguably close to the peak of the housing market boom and because households had cashed 
out almost all of available equity, there is little room left for further cash-outs to support 
consumption. Correspondingly, this estimate declines to virtually zero. Credit constraints 
are also likely during the 2005 and 2007 periods as lenders started to reduce exposure to the 
residential real estate sector. In all cases there is substantial variation in the coefficients of 
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interest indicating that the estimated quantitative effects are not stable even if the 
qualitative relations are maintained. 
The stock holding and income coefficients provide interesting stories as well.  
While stock holdings are statistically significant in the aggregate sample model, the stock 
holdings coefficients are not significant in the first four years of data and are only 
marginally significant in years 2005 and 2007. With growth and use of household wealth 
from residential real estate holdings, the minimal holdings of stock by the typical household 
matter less unless they are the only asset group available. The coefficient of the income 
variable increases from the 1994 model coefficient and is largest in 2007 when income is 
the primary source of consumption due to reduced housing equity and limited other assets. 
The lack of consistent statistical significance in the stock and home equity factors implies 
that while general relations exist, no standard effect coefficients associated with these 
factors are evident since these metrics are all influenced by temporal conditions. Financial, 
housing, and income effects change over time. The magnitude and importance of these 
relations change as evidenced in the substantial changes in the coefficients of interest when 
disaggregated over time. 
The second area of interest that we address is related to the skewed distribution of 
wealth in the United States. Wealthier households presumably possess more in each of the 
net worth components: greater house equity and value, higher income, and larger stock 
holdings. We also know that these factors are not normally distributed across the United 
States population. In an initial assessment, the total sample is divided into groups based on 
net worth. Median regressions are then run with these subsamples. Table 3 displays the 
estimation for the wealthier groups versus the rest, when we define the wealthier group as 
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the top 33%, top 20%, or top 10% of all observations based upon net worth. For all high 
wealth classifications, the elasticities of consumption from home equity, stock holdings, 
and mortgage are higher than the less wealthy households. This is most notable for the 
equity factor as the high wealth cohort coefficients are at least 300% greater than those of 
the lower wealth groups. Also, it is only the higher cohorts of wealth that show a stock 
wealth effect. The top 20% and 33% cohorts show significant impacts, while the coefficient 
on the highest cohort is the largest, but is not statistically significant (due in part to a much 
lower sample size). These wealthy households are much less dependent on income. 
Depending on wealth classification, the elasticities of income for the highest wealth cohorts 
range from 0.076 to 0.05. These coefficients are 25% to 50% lower than for the lower 
wealth groups. Households in the higher wealth groups simply have different consumption 
patterns than the typical household and are more likely to use financing options. 
Concurrently, if a household decides between funding sources of consumption as 
our theory posits, then we should be able to observe different patterns in estimates of wealth 
effects by examining net worth ratios decomposing the wealth components. That is, not 
only does net worth itself matter for estimating consumption elasticities, but also the 
composition of net worth matters. The overall assessment recognizes that a change in the 
composition of net worth will impact composition. For example, the marginal consumption 
of a household with a net worth of $800,000 composed of $200,000 in home equity and 
$600,000 in financial assets would not be the same as one which has $600,000 in home 
equity and $200,000 in financial assets. Financial assets are more liquid and less costly to 
access and housing equity has a carrying cost associated with ownership (property taxes 
and insurance, for example). Consistent with our model, we consider the following three 
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ratios: home equity to net worth, stock holdings to net worth, and house value to net worth. 
We omit the analysis based on the ratio of mortgage to net worth, since home equity is 
already computed as the house value net of outstanding mortgage debt. 
Initial results are presented in Table 4. The top panel of Table 4 presents the results 
based on the percentiles of ratio of home equity to net worth. Since home equity is a 
potential source of funding net of the cash withdrawals from existing mortgage 
indebtedness, we expect this ratio to be relevant to our thesis. Existing equity is the 
component of housing value that can be leveraged when the market condition is favorable. 
A lower ratio indicates a higher cushion of more liquid financial wealth.   
We evaluate home equity to total wealth by segmenting groups based on the ratio of 
home equity to net worth and present three comparisons: the bottom 33%, bottom 20% and 
bottom 10% of households with concurrent comparison with the remaining households in 
the sample. Results show that as we move to the cohort of households with the lowest 
percentage of net worth in home equity (from the bottom 33% to the bottom 10% of 
households), the wealth effect of home equity declines from 0.019 to almost zero and 
ceases to be statistically significant. Concurrently, the coefficients of stock holdings 
steadily increase from 0.010 to 0.043, and become more statistically significant (not 
significant for the 33% cohort and statistically significant at the 1% level for the 10% 
cohort).  The impact of mortgage debt changes little for the cohorts while the coefficients 
remain statistically significant for each cohort. With regard to income, the households with 
a higher percentage of wealth in housing equity have marginal effects that are at least 45% 
greater than those with more financial assets (the bottom 33% to non-bottom 33% 
comparison). Finally, as home equity becomes a lower percentage of wealth, the marginal 
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impact of income decreases. The coefficient on income for the 10% cohort is .052 
versus .0778 for the 33% cohort. 
The middle panel uses a classification based on the ratio of stock holdings to net 
worth.
6
 The greater the ratio shown the greater the percentage of net worth in stock. 
Cohorts are created based on the top 33%, 20% and 10% of households. The minimal 
housing effect is more manifested in this presentation. The magnitude of the equity factor 
coefficients are generally lower and show less statistical significance than in the first panel.  
The stock wealth effect is more evident with larger coefficients for each cohort, which are 
all statistically significant at the 1% level. Of interest, with the exception of the group with 
the highest stock holdings in net worth, the mortgage coefficients are all slightly higher 
than in the first panel while the top group shows no statistical relation. The differences in 
income coefficients are noticeably lower. The major takeaway is the lack of importance of 
housing equity in consumption for the households with the greatest proportion of wealth in 
stock holdings. These households’ consumption is more related to stock holdings.  
The bottom panel (Panel 3) of Table 4 presents results based on the ratio of house value 
to net worth which is used to segment the overall sample. This is a less precise measure 
than the prior two measures, but has been used in prior studies and is thus included here. 
The noted weakness as presented is that the ratio used to segment the sample is directly 
related to variables used in the previous assessments (home value less mortgage debt is 
housing equity). The results are less robust, but support the prior results since housing value 
and housing equity are correlated. Households with highest value of housing, but also with 
the lowest proportion of value to total wealth show no housing equity related wealth effect. 
                                                             
6 In our model and data, we have not considered the fractions in riskless savings deposits, thus 
observations are not exactly switched off in classification tiers based on the ratio of stock holdings versus 
that of housing equity. 
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The stock variable is less robust. The magnitude of stock holdings increases when moving 
to the top tier, but the coefficients of stock holdings are not statistically significant, but the 
other relations are similar. 
Additional robustness checks are provided in Table 5 and Table 6. Median regressions 
using subsamples based on a minimum net worth of $50,000 are presented in Table 5 with 
Table 6 containing results from subsamples with a minimum net worth of $100,000. This is 
to address the concern that low wealth level itself will artificially inflate the ratios with 
wealth as the denominator. These regressions refine and extend the results from those in 
Table 4.  In the first panel of both tables the cohorts again are based on ratio of house equity 
to net worth ratio. For the higher net worth cohorts with greater financial wealth, housing 
equity is not a major influence on consumption, which supports our basic theory. 
Concurrently, when compared to the results in Table 4, in both cases (Table 5 and Table 6 
first panel) the non-bottom samples have larger home equity coefficients (statistically 
significant at the 1% level). This is confirmatory of prior results. The stock holdings results 
are similar with support for a greater impact for those household with lower proportions of 
net worth in housing equity. Interestingly, the relation between mortgage debt and 
consumption is more pronounced than in Panel 1 of Table 4. Even the households with the 
lowest equity as a percent of net worth utilize mortgage debt to influence consumption. The 
income relations are similar although the coefficients on income are lower for the 
households with less financial wealth than in Table 4 (the non-bottom tier column results), 
presumably due to a higher wealth cutoff. 
The biggest differences in the estimation results are found in Panel 2 of Table 5 and 
Table 6.  The results find more in relation between housing equity and consumption than 
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the prior. The non-high ratio of stock to net worth households have large housing equity 
coefficients and even the households with the highest percentage of stock holdings to net 
worth have significant relations. For the high stock asset households, the stocking holding 
coefficients in Tables 5 and 6 are all statistically significant and much larger than in Table 4. 
The stock effect is larger for these cohorts. The mortgage results are similar as are the 
income results, although there may be a slight increase in the coefficients. 
The Table 5 and 6 Panel 3 results are similar and again less robust for reasons already 
addressed. Households with the highest values of housing, but also with the lowest 
proportion of value to total wealth show no housing equity related wealth effect. The stock 
variable is less robust as is the income factor.   
The empirical analysis highlights three substantial points. First, while wealth, housing, 
income, and consumption relations are evident over time and in aggregate, their statistical 
significance and magnitude have substantial variability. There are no generic marginal 
effects. Second, in a country with skewed wealth distribution like the United States, 
marginal effects will differ when this distribution of wealth is addressed. Households with 
the highest level of wealth evidence different wealth, income and consumption relations 
and are more likely to be involved with debt markets that facilitate consumption. Third, 
composition of wealth matters. Households with greater net worth in financial assets 
relative to real estate equity evidence marked differences in consumption patterns. 
Consumption by high net worth households with a greater percentage of net worth in 
financial assets is related to financial assets and not housing wealth.   
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5. Conclusions 
 
A basic understanding of the relations between financial wealth, housing wealth, 
income and consumption provides a foundation for evaluating economic policies and 
assessing prospective economic activity. While the underlying theoretical underpinnings of 
these relations are well-established, empirical assessment has produced ambiguous results. 
Empirical application of theory is extended through the latest real estate boom and bust 
cycle, use of controls for skewed wealth levels in the United States, and by investigating the 
relative composition of household net worth.  
The statistical significance and magnitude of the relations between financial wealth, 
housing wealth, income, and consumption change over time. The influence of these factors 
is subject to large fluctuations. This implies that care is needed in assessing wealth and 
housing effects. There are no out of the box marginal effects that are accurate over all 
economic cycles. The marginal impacts are best understood within the context of 
concurrent economic market conditions. We also show that level of household wealth 
influences marginal consumption patterns including the magnitude and appearance of 
financial wealth, housing wealth, and income effects. The differences in magnitude and 
statistical significance are large with practical implications.    
By acknowledging that the holdings of financial assets are skewed and that the relative 
composition of wealth matters, the literature is further extended. Households with greater 
net worth and those with more financial assets relative to real estate equity exhibit different 
consumption patterns than other households. Consumption by high net worth households 
with a greater percentage of net worth tied to financial assets is related to financial assets 
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and not housing wealth. Higher net worth households are nonetheless users of debt which 
can smooth consumption patterns.    
A need for additional assessment of consumption patterns is evident. The movement of 
retirement benefits to defined contribution plans, the reduction in the percentage of workers 
covered by defined benefit retirement plans, the aging of the boomer generation, and a 
requirement to be more active in one’s own retirement planning will likely change 
consumption patterns. Wealth composition matters. This suggests continued debate.   
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Table 1. Summary statistics 
          
  1994 (obs. 965)   1999 (obs. 583)   2001 (obs. 637)  
 Median Mean Std. Dev Median Mean Std. Dev Median Mean Std. Dev 
          
Age 43 43.3 9.3 45 45.0 9.3 46 45.6 9.3 
Family size 3 3.2 1.3 3 3.1 1.3 3 3.2 1.4 
Marital status  0.84 0.37  0.86 0.35  0.84 0.37 
Income 41,835 49,327 45,173 48,019 60,276 65,181 46,584 58,836 58,708 
Mortgage balance 43,522 52,443 41,433 49,220 60,693 45,009 50,819 60,510 51,599 
Home equity 33,063 47,615 51,549 42,017 56,112 53,697 47,995 67,868 84,890 
Stockholdings 13,495 39,025 87,370 15,006 52,498 120,837 12,422 46,352 100,188 
Net worth 90,486 180,159 370,919 128,752 269,667 778,659 143,987 255,438 781,377 
          
          
  2003 (obs. 965)   2005 (obs. 583)   2007 (obs. 637)  
 Median Mean Std. Dev Median Mean Std. Dev Median Mean Std. Dev 
          
Age 47 46.8 10.0 47 47.4 10.2 48 48.2 10.3 
Family size 3 3.0 1.3 3 3.0 1.2 3 2.9 1.3 
Marital status  0.84 0.37  0.85 0.36  0.85 0.36 
Income 43,478 56,983 89,456 46,250 62,180 111,530 46,551 60,477 60,520 
Mortgage balance 55,163 69,992 65,846 62,274 78,182 71,311 62,711 79,834 75,679 
Home equity 58,424 82,497 99,432 67,076 103,037 137,651 75,216 114,246 162,206 
Stockholdings 13,587 50,891 119,265 12,801 55,131 152,673 14,469 75,326 246,506 
Net worth 148,370 271,708 479,053 173,451 353,996 1,049,661 194,487 395,802 988,101 
          
All values are in constant 1982-84 dollars. 
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Table 2. Median regressions of consumption for all observations and across years 
        
Independent Variables All years 1994 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 
        
        
Log of home equity 0.0244*** 0.0275*** 0.0188 0.0424*** 0.0603*** 0.0060 0.0092 
Log of stock holdings 0.0112*** 0.0089 0.0120 -0.0043 0,0028 0.0159* 0.0193* 
Log of mortgage balance 0.0451*** 0.0451*** 0.0329 0.0834*** 0.0804*** 0.0987*** 0.0374* 
Log of income 0.1119*** 0.0503*** 0.1316*** 0.1149*** 0.1034*** 0.1123*** 0.1564*** 
        
Age 0.0144*** 0.0180** 0.0277* 0.0127 0.0176 0.0283** 0.0009 
Age squared -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0002* 0.0001 
Family size 0.0948*** 0.1048*** 0.0879*** 0.0795*** 0.1133*** 0.0877*** 0.1016*** 
Marital Status 0.1653*** 0.1489*** 0.1601** 0.1834*** 0.1282 0.1795*** 0.1146* 
Dummy: year 1999 -0.9682***       
Dummy: year 2001 -0.9069***       
Dummy: year 2003 -0.8438***       
Dummy: year 2005 -0.7946***       
Dummy: year 2007 -0.0128       
        
Constant 6.6016*** 7.2601*** 5.4108*** 5.4012*** 5.1522*** 5.1709*** 6.6731*** 
Observations 3948 965 583 637 604 584 575 
Pseudo r2 0.4242 0.1699 0.1717 0.1565 0.1950 0.1538 0.1860 
Results are from median regressions. The dependent variable is the logarithm of total non-durable 
consumption. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  For 
year dummy variables, the default year is 1994.  The other variables are self-defined. 
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Table 3: Median regressions of consumption for segmented by net worth percentile groups 
       
   Classification based on percentiles of net worth    
       
Independent Variables Top 33% Non-top 33% Top 20% Non-top 20% Top 10% Non-top 10% 
       
Log of home equity 0.0485*** 0.0167*** 0.0501*** 0.0184*** 0.0671** 0.0223*** 
Log of stock holdings 0.0171** 0.0002 0.0219* 0.0037 0.0322 0.0059 
Log of mortgage balance 0.0694*** 0.0536*** 0.0799*** 0.0516*** 0.1079*** 0.0523*** 
Log of income 0.0768*** 0.1157*** 0.0725*** 0.1101*** 0.0500* 0.1147*** 
       
Observations 1315 2633 788 3160 393 3555 
Pseudo r2 0.3729 0.4427 0.3659 0.4343 0.3500 0.4298 
       
Results are from median regressions. The dependent variable is the logarithm of total non-durable 
consumption. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  For 
year dummy variables, the default year is 1994.  The control variable results are not presented but are as 
expected.  The focus is on the variables of interest. 
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Table 4. Median regressions of consumption for net worth ratio percentile groups 
       
   Classification based on percentiles    
   Ratio of home equity to net worth    
       
Independent 
Variables 
Bottom 
33% 
Non-bottom 33% Bottom 20% Non-bottom 20% Bottom 10% Non-bottom 10% 
       
Log of home equity 0.0187*** 0.0700*** 0.0130* 0.0752*** 0.0065 0.0749*** 
Log of stock holdings 0.0107 0.0034 0.0220** 0.0015 0.0436*** 0.0036 
Log of mortgage balance 0.0645*** 0.0544*** 0.0636*** 0.0522*** 0.0701** 0.0531*** 
Log of income 0.0778*** 0.1127*** 0.0625*** 0.1126*** 0.0520** 0.1133*** 
       
Observations 1315 2633 789 3159 394 3554 
Pseudo R
2
 0.3965 0.4384 0.3874 0.4358 0.3790 0.4331 
       
    Classification based on percentiles   
    Ratio of stock holdings to net worth   
       
Independent 
Variables 
Top 33% Non-top 33% Top 20% Non-top 20% Top 10% Non-top 10% 
       
Log of home equity 0.0128* 0.0278*** 0.0063 0.0280*** 0.0066 0.0285*** 
Log of stock holdings 0.0398*** 0.0153*** 0.0516*** 0.0137*** 0.0545*** 0.0094** 
Log of mortgage balance 0.0703*** 0.0537*** 0.0807*** 0.0538*** 0.0336 0.0605*** 
Log of income 0.1162 0.1027*** 0.1180*** 0.1055*** 0.1294 0.1058*** 
       
Observations 1314 2634 792 3156 395 3553 
Pseudo R
2
 0.4451 0.4144 0.4572 0.4158 0.5016 0.4138 
       
    Classification based on percentiles   
    Ratio of home value to net worth   
       
Independent 
Variables 
Bottom 33% Non-bottom 33% Bottom 20% Non-bottom 20% Bottom 10% Non-bottom 10% 
       
Log of home equity 0.0193** 0.0201*** 0.0147 0.0256*** 0.0118 0.0262*** 
Log of stock holdings 0.0057 0.0097** 0.0100 0.0078* 0.0272 0.0066 
Log of mortgage balance 0.0706*** 0.0618*** 0.0673*** 0.0594*** 0.0598* 0.0600*** 
Log of income 0.0728*** 0.1501*** 0.0762*** 0.1301*** 0.0496 0.1287*** 
       
Observations 1315 2633 789 3459 394 3554 
Pseudo R
2
 0.3870 0.4427 0.3651 0.4386 0.3506 0.4329 
       
Results are from median regressions. The dependent variable is the logarithm of total non-durable 
consumption. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  For 
year dummy variables, the default year is 1994.  The control variable results are not presented but are as 
expected.  The focus is on the variables of interest. 
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Table 5. Median regressions of consumption for different net worth ratio percentile groups (net 
worth ≥ $50,000) 
       
   Classification based on percentiles    
   Ratio of home equity to net worth    
       
Independent 
Variables 
Bottom 33% Non-bottom 33% Bottom 20% Non-bottom 20% Bottom 10% Non-bottom 10% 
       
Log of home equity 0.0184** 0.0932*** 0.0149 0.1030*** 0.0049 0.0906*** 
Log of stock holdings 0.0144* -0.0002 0.0237* -0.0040 0.0395*** 0.0017 
Log of mortgage balance 0.0815*** 0.0570*** 0.0629** 0.0550*** 0.0854*** 0.0582*** 
Log of income 0.0733*** 0.0865*** 0.0604** 0.0892*** 0.0412* 0.0880*** 
       
Observations 1067 2136 640 2563 320 2833 
Pseudo R
2
 0.3827 0.4250 0.3758 0.4219 0.3579 0.4197 
       
    Classification based on percentiles   
    Ratio of stock holdings to net worth   
       
Independent 
Variables 
Top 33% Non-top 33% Top 20% Non-top 20% Top 10% Non-top 10% 
       
Log of home equity 0.0421*** 0.0325*** 0.0136 0.0431*** 0.0341* 0.0402*** 
Log of stock holdings 0.0449*** 0.0114* 0.0655*** 0.0087 0.0971*** 0.0069 
Log of mortgage balance 0.0828** 0.0632*** 0.0719*** 0.0617*** 0.0258 0.0661*** 
Log of income 0.0892*** 0.0771*** 0.1048*** 0.0775*** 0.0861** 0.0833*** 
       
Observations 1067 2136 640 2563 321 2882 
Pseudo R
2
 0.4412 0.3967 0.4443 0.4014 0.4840 0.3995 
       
    Classification based on percentiles   
    Ratio of home value to net worth   
       
Independent 
Variables 
Bottom 33% Non-bottom 33% Bottom 20% Non-bottom 20% Bottom 10% Non-bottom 10% 
       
Log of home equity 0.0304*** 0.0492*** 0.0137 0.0532*** 0.0124 0.0473*** 
Log of stock holdings 0.0119 0.0033 0.0182* 0.0007 0.0221 0.0047 
Log of mortgage balance 0.0798*** 0.0648*** 0.0719*** 0.0670*** 0.0728* 0.0648*** 
Log of income 0.0737*** 0.1000*** 0.0736*** 0.0892*** 0.0200 0.1018*** 
       
Observations 1067 2136 640 2563 319 2884 
Pseudo R
2
 0.3886 0.4184 0.3542 0.4241 0.3644 0.4139 
       
Results are from median regressions. The dependent variable is the logarithm of total non-durable 
consumption. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  For 
year dummy variables, the default year is 1994.  The control variable results are not presented but are as 
expected.  The focus is on the variables of interest. 
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Table 6. Median regressions of consumption for different net worth ratio percentile groups (net 
worth ≥ $100,000) 
       
   Classification based on percentiles    
   Ratio of home equity to net worth    
       
Independent 
Variables 
Bottom 33% Non-bottom 33% Bottom 20% Non-bottom 20% Bottom 10% Non-bottom 10% 
       
Log of home equity 0.0137 0.0978*** 0.0133 0.0981*** 0.0018 0.0923*** 
Log of stock holdings 0.0097 -0.0023 0.0255* -0.0035 0.0367** -0.0000 
Log of mortgage balance 0.0661*** 0.0605*** 0.0873*** 0.0546*** 0.0949** 0.0613*** 
Log of income 0.0701*** 0.0907*** 0.0655*** 0.0943*** 0.0310 0.0949*** 
       
Observations 793 1589 475 1907 237 2145 
Pseudo R
2
 0.3712 0.4074 0.3609 0.4065 0.3710 0.4015 
       
    Classification based on percentiles   
    Ratio of stock holdings to net worth   
       
Independent 
Variables 
Top 33% Non-top 33% Top 20% Non-top 20% Top 10% Non-top 10% 
       
Log of home equity 0.0335*** 0.0223** -0.0051 0.0369*** 0.0470*** 0.0374*** 
Log of stock holdings 0.0787*** 0.0072 0.0949*** 0.0070 0.1074*** 0.0023 
Log of mortgage balance 0.0751*** 0.0561*** 0.0634*** 0.0566*** 0.0416* 0.0621*** 
Log of income 0.0921*** 0.0817*** 0.0991*** 0.0798*** 0.0895*** 0.0901*** 
       
Observations 793 1589 475 1907 237 2145 
Pseudo R
2
 0.4392 0.3785 0.4547 0.3818 0.4842 0.3845 
       
    Classification based on percentiles   
    Ratio of home value to net worth   
       
Independent 
Variables 
Bottom 33% Non-bottom 33% Bottom 20% Non-bottom 20% Bottom 10% Non-bottom 10% 
       
Log of home equity 0.0213** 0.0538*** 0.0045 0.0454** 0.0059 0.0456*** 
Log of stock holdings 0.0108 -0.0022 0.0187 -0.0042 0.0368*** -0.0023 
Log of mortgage balance 0.0645*** 0.0664*** 0.0377 0.0682*** 0.0722*** 0.0554*** 
Log of income 0.0744*** 0.0971*** 0.0661*** 0.1001*** 0.0127 0.1051*** 
       
Observations 794 1588 476 1906 238 2144 
Pseudo R
2
 0.3672 0.4076 0.3724 0.4014 0.3892 0.3966 
       
Results are from median regressions. The dependent variable is the logarithm of total non-durable 
consumption. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  For 
year dummy variables, the default year is 1994.  The control variable results are not presented but are as 
expected.  The focus is on the variables of interest 
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